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Abstract
The relationship between Brussels and Belgrade has never been straightforward. Following 
the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević, EU authorities have welcomed different opposition 
forces and altogether failed to pursue reforms and consolidate institutional infrastructure. 
Accordingly, this paper examines the EU’s position vis-à-vis the increasing semi-
authoritarianism in Serbia. It is argued that as long as the problematic Serbian elites pretend, 
or even manage to meet some of the EU’s expectations, the Brussels administration will 
continue to ignore the pursuit of a wide range of unfavourable domestic policies. Such an 
approach has regrettably given the Serbian regime the opportunity to cement its power base, 
thereby obstructing the implementation of any substantial democratic improvements.   
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the European Union (EU) and Serbia has never been 
straightforward. Following the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as independent 
states in the early 1990s, the EU’s participation in economic sanctions against the 
newly established Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, severely affected the Serbian 
citizens but not the regime of Slobodan Milošević. It consolidated further by 
benefiting from the proceeds of a black market economy and various media outlets 
constantly accusing the West, as well as the democratic opposition, of being anti-
Serbian. Moreover, when different opposition representatives requested Western 
support for the emerging democratic force necessary to oust Milošević and prevent 
additional violence, their efforts were ignored (Panić 2015: 78). This, together with 
the rejection by the EU’s representatives in late 1996 of the opposition Zajedno 
[Together] alliance’s municipal victories in favour of Milošević’s decision to annul 
the results and demand new elections, were interpreted as the West’s intention to 
assist Milošević, the perceived key factor in the whole process, to stay in power 
(Spoerri 2015: 46-47). 
Later, with the progress of the Kosovo crisis and the 1999 NATO intervention, 
the West started to promote narrative suggesting that the time to get rid of Milošević 
had come. In contrast to previous years, substantial foreign aid was allocated to 
the democratic opposition, which seemed to have become more united in contrast 
to a decline in popular support for the regime (Spoerri 2015). Once Milošević 
was overthrown in October 2000, the West welcomed the new democratic forces. 
Although initially cooperative, the coalition leadership faced several internal 
conflicts with various members trying to promote their separate visions for the 
country’s future. The politics of alternatives or other opportunities, as well as an 
ever-present struggle with the processes of democratisation and Europeanisation, 
provided enough space for the opposition (many of whose members had once sided 
with and played important roles under the Milošević regime, although they were 
never subjected to a lustration afterwards) to organise and challenge the political elite 
(Radeljić 2014; Radeljić 2017). Consequently, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) 
was established in 2008 by Tomislav Nikolić and Aleksandar Vučić, the former 
Deputy President and General Secretary respectively of the ultranationalist Serbian 
Radical Party (its leader, Vojislav Šešelj, was on trial at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at the time). As soon as the former Radicals 
turned into Progressivists, they started to place an emphasis on their apparently new 
profile and, even more so, on expected outcomes. The reasoning behind this is that 
they would appear to differ significantly from their previous affiliation. Apart from 
discrediting the performance of the then leadership, the SNS invested efforts in 
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promoting military neutrality, greater social justice, worldwide cooperation and EU 
membership. In 2012, Nikolić’s advocacy secured him the presidency. Two years 
later, Vučić progressed from being First Deputy Prime Minister to Prime Minister, 
a position which he held until becoming President of Serbia in May 2017. Their 
radical past and far-right rhetoric no longer seemed relevant.
In this paper I look at the EU’s position vis-à-vis the increasing semi-
authoritarianism in Serbia. In her seminal work, Marina Ottaway defines semi-
authoritarian regimes as “ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of 
liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect 
for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even 
authoritarian traits. This ambiguous character, furthermore, is deliberate. Semi-
authoritarian systems are not imperfect democracies struggling toward improvement 
and consolidation but regimes determined to maintain the appearance of democracy 
without exposing themselves to the political risks that free competition entails” 
(Ottaway 2003: 3). With this in mind, the Progressivists’ behaviour in Serbia is 
undoubtedly semi-authoritarian and the EU has largely refrained from confronting 
it. While welcoming the Progressivists with Aleksandar Vučić at the forefront, the 
Brussels authorities have regularly suggested that they expected a lot from him in 
terms of regional developments – primarily in the case of the Kosovo’s status, but 
also in terms of Serbia’s problematic ambition to position itself between the East 
and the West. This in turn could be interpreted as indicating that, as long as Vučić 
was prone to responding to their demands, a whole range of domestic policies – 
some more detrimental than others – would be of secondary concern. Aware of the 
expected dynamics, the regime has used every opportunity to further reinforce its 
power.
2. THE EU WELCOMES THE FORMER RADICALS TURNED 
PROGRESSIVISTS
The literature tackling Western support of corrupt, military and authoritarian 
regimes is voluminous. For example, during the Cold War, the West (in particular 
the USA) supported such regimes in its fight against Communism, whilst the 
Soviets tended to support undemocratic regimes against the West. This suggests 
that “[t]he international system can play a permissive role, as well as a very active 
role, in democratization, and it can support or block democratic change” (Bunce, 
McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2010: 10). The present EU has regularly collaborated 
with countries whose regimes are authoritarian (Babayan and Risse 2015) and, 
furthermore, its recent involvement in the Arab Spring has led to its actions 
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being questioned in the context of whether they actually assisted authoritarian 
instead of democratic rule (Börzel and van Hüllen 2014). Even more recently, 
we have seen how mutual interests in the Russo-Hungarian case can alienate an 
existing EU member state from the Brussels authorities (Buzogány 2017). This 
logically encourages a debate about possible alternatives and regime preferences, 
as authoritarians are likely to oppose and negatively affect support for the EU 
(Tillman 2013). This is even more striking if we consider projections suggesting 
that authoritarianism is likely to rise (Bloom 2016; Diamond 2008; Puddington 
2008), accompanied by more international collaboration among authoritarian 
regimes with the aim of maximising domestic survival (von Soest 2015). Looking 
at the Balkans, “[m]any countries in the region have a record of electing persons 
who behave in an authoritarian way after the ‘democratic’ election” (Farkas 2007: 
65). Still, before fully endorsing authoritarianism, political actors may embrace 
semi-authoritarian modus operandi as a starting point; as some authors have put 
it, “unfavourable conditions – including weak democratic institutions and political 
organizations, persistent authoritarian traditions, major socioeconomic problems, 
and ethnic and religious conflicts – create formidable obstacles to the establishment 
and, above all, the consolidation of democracy” (Ottaway 2003: 4-5).
In the case of Serbia, the Serbian Progressive Party has, since its inauguration, 
continuously pursued the idea of doing what it deemed necessary for Serbia to 
move forward. Indeed, by continuously accusing the then Democratic Party-led 
government of (1) having failed to address Serbia’s unsatisfactory economic 
performance, high levels of corruption across all sectors, poverty and unemployment 
rates, and (2) having allowed some of its own representatives to develop 
individual and often corrupt activities contradicting the party’s original aims, the 
SNS, notwithstanding, received impressive support in the 2012 presidential and 
parliamentary elections. Following Tomislav Nikolić’s victory, some EU officials 
noted that Serbia was “at a crossroads”; his victory “proved that the country’s 
political landscape had become more complex and that the EU needs to be involved 
in an intensive dialogue with Serbian authorities and all political leaders from the 
very first moment” (Lajčák 2012). Indeed, José Manuel Barroso, President of the 
European Commission, welcomed Nikolić to Brussels, interpreting his choice for 
his first official visit abroad as “a clear sign of the priority the President and Serbia 
attach to their European reform agenda” (Barroso 2012). Aleksandar Vučić, the 
First Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia after the 2012 parliamentary elections and 
subsequently, the most visible member of the Serbian political elite, had an abrupt 
volte-face regarding reformist, Zoran Djindjić, whom he had initially vehemently 
opposed. For example, after Djindjić’s assassination in 2003, he even posted a fake 
street plaque with the name of war crimes fugitive, Ratko Mladić, on a Belgrade 
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boulevard named after Djindjić in 2007. Vučić has since altered his position to the 
extent that he started recalling and expressing appreciation for Djindjić’s pro-EU 
stance and vision of Serbia’s future. He is even on record as saying that he actually 
felt flattered when compared to him (B92 2013) and in interview with the German 
daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ 2014), he tried to defend his drastic 
transformation by claiming that he misinterpreted the post-Cold War trends for a 
long time and thus developed wrong ideas.
Overall, by analysing the period following the 2012 elections, it can be argued 
that the Progressivists have decided to switch their focus from an advocacy of life 
for politics to a life from politics – a tendency largely confirmed by the growing 
intention to replace political figures with different political affiliations with the most 
trustworthy members of the Serbian Progressive Party. Securing a whole range 
of positions in public administration institutions has meant direct influence on 
those institutions, cross-sectoral collaboration and also involvement in numerous 
private sector endeavours whose approval and realisation directly depend on state 
permission. More problematically, by the 2014 snap elections, viable opposition in 
Serbia had vanished with political plurality being seriously endangered. However, 
the Brussels authorities welcomed newly-elected Prime Minister Vučić as someone 
who could be trusted. For example, Commissioner Barroso said that “[he is] confident 
that under [Vučić’s] determined guidance, Serbia will succeed in addressing the key 
challenges ahead” (European Commission 2014a). And, when EU foreign policy 
chief, Catherine Ashton, told him that the EU is “determined to help and support 
Serbia in its efforts to ensure a strong economic path for its people”, Vučić reassured 
her: “We are not poor people seeking charity, we need support for true reforms” 
(RFE 2014). German Chancellor Angela Merkel also congratulated Vučić on his 
election and invited him to visit Berlin, which he eventually did. On this occasion, 
she praised his efforts and assured him that Germany would support Serbia on its 
road to the EU, although she also underscored the significance of reforms, the rule 
of law and further normalisation of relations with Kosovo (Mitrović 2014).
The EU’s welcoming stance and signature of the 2013 Brussels Agreement 
between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo on the normalisation of relations 
between them, as well as the opening of negotiations for Serbia’s EU accession 
in 2014, provided Vučić with more credibility and potential for manoeuvring at 
home and vis-à-vis the EU. His apparent readiness to pursue economic reforms and 
market liberalisation sounded much more attractive to foreigners’ ears than them 
getting involved in discussions over his intentions to minimise any competition 
for power and the suppression of the opposition. The studies on semi-authoritarian 
regimes also make a reference to the pursuit of economic reforms and reduction of 
government control in the context of international pressure: “[S]emi-authoritarian 
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regimes can undergo market liberalization with little political liberalization or 
separation of economic elites from political elites. The linkage between economic 
liberalization and democratization is complex, and it is dangerous to assume that the 
former always encourages the latter” (Ottaway 2003: 18). So, Western governments 
have intentionally avoided adopting a firmer stance against any government 
policies going against so-called Western values. They expect much from the Vučić 
government that would not only serve the West’s geopolitical and geoeconomic 
interests in Serbia, but also in the Western Balkan region as a whole. Different 
European Commission statements about Serbia’s progress have communicated a 
highly problematic message that the status quo, with some occasional baby-steps, 
is actually acceptable. For example, one statement in 2014 indicated that “[t]here is 
a strong political impetus to fight corruption” and “[t]he new government remains 
fully committed to EU integration” (European Commission 2014b: 1, 8). A year 
later the Brussels technocrats agreed that “Serbia’s institutions for preventing 
corruption broadly meet international standards and have shown good potential” 
with sporadic suggestions as to what should be improved (European Commission 
2015: 52).
In reality, the government failed to enhance the business climate, downsize the 
public sector or come up with measures that would introduce meritocracy in the public 
sector. More precisely, the Vučić regime took control of it and poured enormous 
subsidies into public enterprises, the so-called big budget losers. Altogether, they 
have employed thousands of new party members, many of them in fictional jobs. 
The German sociologist, Max Weber – whom Vučić paradoxically tends to quote 
when saying that the Serbian people should adopt the protestant work ethic and 
be more like the Germans (Malić 2016) – used to write about the benefit-inspired 
relationship between leaders and their supporters: “The party following, above all 
the party official and party entrepreneur, naturally expect personal compensation 
from the victory of their leader – that is, offices or other advantages … They expect 
that the demagogic effect of the leader’s personality during the election fight of the 
party will increase votes and mandates and thereby power, and, thereby, as far as 
possible, will extend opportunities to their followers to find the compensation for 
which they hope” (Weber 2009 [1919]: 103). So, many members joined the SNS 
purely because of available benefits and not because of the party’s programme and 
ideological doctrine. The more the leadership has succeeded in proving that party 
membership leads to benefits (such as employment, career change, promotion, 
additional capital accumulation, etc.), the stronger the interest in being affiliated 
with the party.  
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3. ‘L’ÉTAT, C’EST MOI’
The outcome of the April 2016 parliamentary elections, which reconfirmed 
Vučić’s dominance, came as no surprise. As a prime minister, he had been 
craftily solidifying power during the previous few years, taking control over state 
institutions as well as non-state actors, such as media. The scholarship discussing 
power diffusion has carefully explained that “in today’s information age, so many 
decisions are made outside the control of even the most powerful states. Power 
diffusion also widens the scope of coalition-building. Leaders must win the support 
of not only other states but also a whole range of non-state actors including 
media, NGOs, and businesses” (Cooper 2015: 42). In Serbia, ninety-seven local 
and national-level opposition leaders were arrested in the previous four years. In 
almost all of these cases the charges were dropped and no indictments were handed 
down. Of the remainder, only four trials actually commenced, but no verdicts were 
delivered (Vasić 2015). In local elections, tens of opposition activists were 
attacked or kidnapped and the police did not resolve a single case (Novi Magazin 
2014). Finally, the elections confirmed that the relevant administration had not been 
reformed and, even worse, that the elections suffered serious irregularities which 
cast a shadow on the democratic process (Balkanist 2016).
Since 2012, the dominant media in Serbia have generally tended to support 
Vučić’s actions and reactions at home and abroad. By avoiding criticism and, even 
more worryingly, applying auto-censorship as a result of warnings and pressures 
about what can or cannot be reported, the media have indirectly facilitated the 
continuation of well-embedded practices. One analysis uses a pyramidal structure to 
illustrate the trend; in this case, “[m]anipulations under the mask of free media help 
the pyramid to expand in ways [in which] it sustains itself. This is most obviously 
reflected in the leader’s unusually frequent appearances in the media. Moreover, 
there are more and more journalists and celebrities joining the pyramid. These are 
exactly the conditions for self-censorship and inferiority to the leader … Many 
people choose to obey the rules of practice in order to preserve their positions and 
benefits” (Kelić 2016). It is also worth remembering that Vučić was in charge of the 
Ministry of Information in the late 1990s when Slobodan Milošević was in power: 
“[He] was the hatchet man for the media who defended the vast ethnic cleansing 
by paramilitary police of more than 60% of the 90%-majority Albanians living 
in the Serbian province of Kosovo” (Pond 2013: 7). Back then, newspapers were 
regularly fined or, even worse, closed, so that the public would primarily gather 
information from the state-controlled media or other media working in favour of the 
ruling elite. In fact, as Timothy Garton Ash (2009: 6-7, 16) has put it, “[t]he single 
most important pillar of [the Milošević] regime was the state television, which 
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he used to sustain a nationalist siege mentality, especially among people in the 
country and small towns who had few other sources of information … Milošević’s 
dictatorship was a television dictatorship. And television was equally central to 
the revolution. From teledictatorship, via telerevolution, to teledemocracy”. Thus, 
aware of this and the ever-increasing relevance of the media in an information age, 
the Vučić regime has been determined to secure support from as many channels of 
communication as possible.
If we consider some of the European Commission’s assessments regarding the 
media situation in Serbia, we can see that the former has been conscious of the 
problems. For example, in 2012, the annual progress report stressed that “violence 
and threats against journalists remain of concern, although their frequency has 
decreased slightly. The Serbian authorities have continued to provide police protection 
for journalists and media outlets which have received threats. Investigations into 
murders of journalists dating back to the late 1990s/early 2000s and into recurring 
threats against journalists have so far failed to identify the perpetrators … Access to 
advertising in the media remains under the control of a few economic and political 
actors, entailing a significant risk of influence on the media and of self-censorship” 
(European Commission 2012: 14). Two years later, the Brussels administration 
seemed even more concerned; this time around, it supported its findings by citing the 
OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, according to which, 
“media reporting was insufficiently analytical and was influenced by the political 
parties in power, including through public funding, which led to widespread media 
self-censorship” (European Commission 2014b: 7). In the Commission’s view, 
“efforts are expected to identify and prosecute suspects of violations of internet 
freedoms. Pending the full implementation of the newly adopted legislative package, 
the Serbian media continued to operate in a blurred legal environment which delayed 
the state’s withdrawal from media ownership, one of the cornerstones of the 2011 
media strategy” (European Commission 2014b: 46). Most recently, the Commission 
noted that “[c]ivil society organisations (CSOs) and human rights defenders, who 
play a key role in raising awareness of civil, political and socioeconomic rights, 
continued to operate in a public and media environment often hostile to criticism” 
(European Commission 2016: 8), while “[h]ate speech is often tolerated in the media 
and is rarely tackled by regulatory authorities or prosecutors. Statements by state 
officials in relation to the investigative work of journalists have not been conducive 
to creating an environment in which freedom of expression can be exercised without 
hindrance” (European Commission 2016: 61).
Looking more closely at media performance during the 2016 election campaign, 
there was no record of a debate between government and opposition; prominent 
journalists were fired for reporting about government failures (Hadrović 2017; 
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Petrović 2016). For example, the Crime and Corruption Reporting Network’s 
journalist, Stevan Dojčinović, who was investigating the property of public officials 
including Vučić (Dojčinović and Petrović 2016), was attacked by a pro-government 
tabloid with Vučić’s aides labelling him a “foreign spy” and “conspirator” working 
for “the Western forces” (Informer 2016a; Informer 2016b). In fact, in its earlier 
extensive study, Human Rights Watch (2015) had exposed and criticised “[t]he 
inadequate state response to attacks and threats against journalists and media outlets, 
political interference including through the courts and curbs on funding, and smear 
campaigns targeting critical media and journalists”. It also urged EU institutions, 
the OSCE Representative on Media Freedom and different Council of Europe 
departments to pressure the relevant authorities in Serbia to address the problems. In 
return, Prime Minister Vučić called the independent Balkan Investigative Reporting 
Network “liars” financed by Michael Davenport, the Head of the EU delegation in 
Serbia, to attack the Serbian government (Balkan Insight 2015; Dragojlo 2016). 
This was a similar reaction to the one he had when addressing the OSCE: “They are 
lying, and when you’re lying, it is elementary decency to apologize. I will not let 
anyone attack Serbia … The OSCE has uttered falsehood and lies, and I’m telling 
the truth” (cited in Barlovac 2014).
None of the above has significantly eroded the government’s popularity. Based 
on his previous involvement in politics, the Vučić regime has clearly understood 
what works with both domestic and international audiences. As it has always 
insisted, multiparty elections are held, the rights of citizens are theoretically 
recognised (although not always in practice), civil society and non-governmental 
organisations exist and manage to conduct research and communicate their findings 
(usually thanks to foreign financial assistance), the media reporting goes on, with 
the Internet being loaded with critical thinking, etc. Alongside this and in the context 
of semi-authoritarianism, “incumbent governments and parties are in no danger of 
losing their hold on power, not because they are popular but because they know 
how to play the democracy game and still retain control” (Ottaway 2003: 6). In the 
case of Serbia, playing the democracy game is further facilitated when the profile 
of the average voter is considered. Back in 2013, some surveys demonstrated that 
the typical voter tended to be largely uninformed or undereducated, with an interest 
in tabloids, reality TV shows and sports events. Even though he used to vote for the 
Democratic Party in the past, he now voted for the Serbian Progressive Party – a 
switch outlining the disloyal nature of half of the electorate and a tendency to vote 
for the majority party (Latković 2013). Right before the 2016 elections, different 
surveys repeated the previous description of the electorate, confirming that the 
support for the Progressivists was still strong and likely to remain so, at least for 
the foreseeable future (Vukadinović 2016).
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In 2017, Aleksandar Vučić became the President of Serbia after crushing his 
opponents in the first round by winning 55% of the vote. While Vučić himself stated 
that “[w]hen you have results like this, there is no instability – Serbia is strong and 
it will be even stronger” (cited in Macdowall 2017), some academics nevertheless 
pointed out that “[t]his election was over before it began, for the same reason that 
last year’s parliamentary elections were. The tight control that the governing party 
exercises over media, information, employment, and the distribution of benefits 
means that there is no level playing field and voters are not in a position to freely 
make an informed choice” (Gordy 2017). Given his dominance in the party and 
the Progressivists’ majority in the parliament, this particular victory turned Vučić 
into the strongest and most influential political figure in Serbia which, in the long 
run, could mean more authoritarianism. EU representatives congratulated him in a 
similar manner as before; for example, in a joint letter, Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude 
Juncker, on behalf of the European Council and the European Commission, stated 
that Vučić’s straight victory is a clear confirmation of the people’s support for his 
EU-orientated programme. They also expressed confidence in his ability to promote 
regional stability and cooperation as well as moving forward the dialogue between 
Belgrade and Priština (EURACTIV 2017). A direct consequence of the glorification of 
Vučić’s regional engagement is that the West’s reliance on him will continue to keep 
him in power, whilst EU accession becomes of secondary relevance to him and the 
Brussels administration, alike. As could be expected, the street protests, which took 
place immediately after the election outcome – mostly attended by young people 
and students, shouting that the elections were not fair and that Serbia was becoming 
a dictatorship (Krajñák 2017; Rudić and Djurić 2017) – did not generate any critical 
reflection among the Brussels authorities. Cognisant of the external favourable 
position, Vučić himself reflected upon the chants Vučić, You Stole the Election! and 
End the Dictatorship!: “There are always people not satisfied with election results 
… It’s a democratic process. Nobody intervened, we allowed them to protest” 
(cited in Rudić and Djurić 2017). Even here, by remaining calm in front of social 
discontent (mainly because of the participants’ lack of organisation and therefore the 
unlikelihood of challenging the regime) (Pešić 2017), Vučić secured additional points 
internationally as being someone truly committed to functioning democracy.
4. CONCLUSION
The failure of post-Milošević and, even more worryingly, post-Djindjić 
leaderships to consolidate democracy and develop a clear future orientation of 
the Serbian state, has provided space for the formation of the Serbian Progressive 
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Party and the subsequent semi-authoritarian regime. The Vučić government has 
taken control of the media and numerous in-desperate-need-of-reform public 
sector institutions, leaving an impression that he has engineered his own system 
and is capable of remaining dominant over time. The Progressivists’ insistence on 
the politics of opportunity has undoubtedly helped them generate public support 
at home as well as strengthening the Serbian regime’s relevance internationally. 
European Union representatives have welcomed Radicals turned Progressivists 
whilst turning a blind eye to numerous questionable moves and decisions. As 
pointed out, as long as the Progressivists continue to cooperate with the West or, 
at least, leave an impression of such an intention, the quality of political pluralism, 
state institutions, electoral procedures and media reporting, among others, is left 
to the regime to regulate. Nevertheless, the support for the EU in Serbia is at 
its lowest since 2000, which means that the EU is actually a big underachiever 
in the Serbian case (Cvijić 2017). More and more voices have argued that the 
rise of Vučić has, in fact, weakened the support for the EU because it revealed 
the EU’s hypocrisy towards its core principles and values, such as the rule of 
law and human rights. Many from the intellectual elite, who firmly advocated 
EU accession in the past, are now disenchanted with the EU’s lack of reaction 
to Vučić’s alleged undermining of democratic principles. The result is that the 
forces underpinning the pro-EU agenda in public appearances have rapidly 
diminished, so it has become quite difficult to find those who would publicly 
confront the anti-EU forces. Vučić and his closest associates are known for being 
prone to sending mixed messages. On the one hand, they have declaratively 
supported EU values, pledged for EU accession and so on whilst, on the other 
hand, the slightest external criticism has resulted in a narrative that the West wants 
to overthrow Vučić, that big powers are working against Serbia and that Russia 
makes for a more honest friend. As rightly noted elsewhere, “Russia is positioned 
as the first friendly Other in the anti-European debates ... [It] is recognized as 
having historical ties with Serbia based on economic and energy collaboration, 
as well as certain cultural and religious commonalities and a similar language” 
(Russell-Omaljev 2016: 55, 103-5). With this in mind, it is not possible to exclude 
the scenario in which Vučić will turn to Russia upon realising that his pro-EU 
agenda is capable of generating more harm than benefit in terms of votes.
In case of the above turn, the Brussels administration would most likely start 
putting pressure on the regime, labelling its domestic policies as detrimental and 
not in accordance with the EU’s accession agenda. At this point, Vučić’s semi-
authoritarian behaviour would suddenly become highly problematic and the West 
could claim the need to come up with a new approach so as to allow Serbia to 
genuinely pursue processes of democratisation and Europeanisation. As in other 
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cases, the foreigners could opt for sanctions, which are generally ineffective, often 
causing more problems than they resolve. Accordingly, the West might decide 
to take the opposition seriously and provide it with necessary assistance so as to 
overthrow the regime – repeating what it already did with Milošević. In such a 
case, the infamous notion of lessons learnt would be defeated and become quite 
irrelevant for any future EU involvement in Serbia.
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